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Chinese Strategy and Possible US Options – Analysis – Eurasia Review

By Kapil Bhatia *

The gradual use of Chinese nationwide pressure-binding instruments in the South China Sea (SCS) is a information-based mostly technique. Designed to remain under the edge of typical army conflict.2 This combined strategy minimizes international involvement, localises issues and ensures controversial outcomes for China. For smaller gamers in the region, this poses vital safety, sovereignty and financial challenges, particularly because of their restricted capability to deal with a classy and integrated Chinese strategy.

At the similar time, the US strategy to avoiding regional points has led partners / allies to question the American commitment. The shortage of a complete US response also permits China to vary its regional geostrategic panorama unchanged. Any modifications in the SCS dynamics will even have a wider impression on US and international security benefits that affect international sovereignty, justice methods, and international commerce. The recalibration of the American strategy is important to comprehensively tackle China's compelling gray zones challenges in SCS by making a coherent technique and organizing all diplomatic, info, army and economic choices.

Chinese Strategy in SCS

may be outlined as rules or policies to realize the aim
gradual steps relatively than steep modifications. As a world
concept of relationships, compelling graduality
might be outlined as "a country that uses national coercive measures."
energy in a synchronized and built-in approach to obtain objectives
Step-by-step. “3 Obligatory graduality allows the progressive promotion of the pursuits of states, in contrast to one coup.
For China, the gradual compulsion is a broader idea that states it
technique. Deng Xiaoping, the primary manager
The Individuals's Republic of China referred to the gradual "pulling the river
figuring out the rocks. Nevertheless, this text focuses primarily on such approaches in SCS.

China has persistently used broader rules
The gradual promotion of the compulsive progression of SCS.
chronological analysis of Chinese activity in SCS reveals a
a coherent and gradual strategy. Starting from simple burning occasions
In 2005, China's strategy has progressed regularly and regularly
as of 2009, battle conditions in 2011, yr 2012 t
and ship collisions after 2014.6
Incremental fisheries management, which was initially banned in 2012, is
progressively the requirement for Chinese fishing permits from 2014.7 As well as, all of the disputed areas of SCS have been positioned beneath administrative management of Hainan Province8.
China Declaration on Aviation Identification Zone (ADIZ)
In East China in 2013, controlled by South Korean and Russian airspace
Japan, is another instance of creeping management. Analysts claim it
China might attempt to implement comparable identification areas
SCS in the future by harmonizing its general gradual goals.9
SCS's giant-scale restoration is another
An instance of a gradual means of progressive islands
changed the state of affairs, profitable John Mearsheimer's reference
"Water stop power". 10 One researcher referred to this "gradual fait supplier", which said that "We do a lot of this, but we forget it in a moment." 11 In actuality, China employs the SCS's step-by-step technique of coercive measures and outcomes to advertise its interests

An unwelcome Chinese technique to pressure
The gradual help of SCS is actively, successfully
Complete Grey Zone Details.12 U.S.
“Competitive interactions (and inside) inside states and states
between the normal warfare and the duality of peace. "13
Grey techniques is an indispensable accessory for compelling commencement, resembling
Danger administration is an important think about graduality. Because of the alleged
at the finish is to ensure that "the actual or observed reaction to incremental
motion does not cause unreasonable costs, ”within the grey zone techniques are activated
alternatives for graduality by supporting further features
acceptable prices.14 The technique in the grey zone of China is skilfully steering political, army and business instruments to affect, scare,
and / or forcing the target nations whereas containing such approaches
The edge of unreasonable political prices or direct army provocation.15

Though the concept of the gray zone is just not new, it’s
the scope and sophistication of Chinese grey zones approaches
Actual attention. To be truthful, many nations – including Russia, North
Korea and Iran – have made techniques in the gray zone over time.
Nevertheless, the tools for SCS Chinese gray areas are more complete,
and co-ordinated than other comparable methods
these days. A number of the techniques are domination of the world,
fisheries control, prohibition of fishing grounds, useful resource
research within the waters in query, network and info activities, and. t ,
lawfare. Each exercise is arranged so that it remains under the nominal
– a threshold to stop wider regional / international nervousness and. ,
reply. For instance, the Chinese delivery militia is committed
activities categorised as classical army operations akin to
patrolling, entry management and kinetic commitments. Examples are
USNS Disturbance 2009 is a flawless confiscation of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal.
But the militia is the preferred software because there’s an illusion
the acceptability of army activities in comparison with sovereign army action
activities. It isn’t shocking that militia is known as the "third sea"
the facility of the blue hull ”(after the navy's hulls and coast guards
white our bodies) what the Chinese name "war without a weapon."
smoke. “17 Using the mile is
combined with different grey zone tools reminiscent of service provider ships, delivery
fishing vessels, fishing fleets and info actions. such
instruments give a signal of "navy" for a continuous, forming
[where] even merchants and fishing boats can build mines and
oversee overseas warships.
Chinese scientists think about the instruments of grey zones to be a official option to proceed
nationwide targets. One researcher states that "the strategy can still be thought-about
a flexible approach to resolve disputes. . . . Such actions are normal and justified in China's personal waters. "19
So it is no shock that China is conducting marine research
new heights on ships with strengthened hulls, exterior rails
Collision Injury and Water Gun Aid.20 The techniques used in the gray zone type a visual vector that helps a broader Chinese strategy of compelling progression in SCS.

Compelling graduality coupled with gray techniques shouldn’t be an instantaneous strategy, and China's strategic computation requires constant momentum for such approaches. There are two primary reasons to emphasise this momentum. Firstly, states which might be pursuing diplomatic objectives, corresponding to China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, are favored by the gray areas which were accomplished. These states are "dissatisfied with the current situation and [are] have decided to change the aspects of the global division of power and influence in their favor." 21 At the similar time, revisminist states are not looking for the danger of larger enlargement, but use them "Step by step steps to secure a strategic leverage". 22 These techniques are a way of challenging and finally changing the best way during which international politics works with out incurring extreme prices and attention.23 Secondly, China believes that SCS is of strategic importance, whose depth is usually underestimated. Just as Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico have been crucial to the USA in the early 20th century, China believes that SCS management is a prerequisite for its wider maritime business. Mahan believed that "the geographic basis is a strategy" and burdened that the strategic value of any position trusted "its assets…. and essential both commercially and politically, however politically uncertain, forcing attention and inspiring the envy of the more powerful peoples. assets in key places by means of an unprecedented recovery and militarization program. Conflict School in 2010, “Every inch of the“ blue area ”is of nice worth to China.” 27

Regional / Worldwide Commitments and Response
Zone approaches are to rearrange issues to avoid being robust
regional / international resistance or response. Principally the core
The purpose is to attenuate exterior interference systematically
changing regional dynamics. One researcher notes that Chinese efforts
“They stay under the thresholds that produce a robust US or
a world response, however they are robust and deliberate. . .
Get measurable guess over time. "28
Chinese justification for creating a 10,000-foot trajectory artificially
islands seemingly "better reply typhoons and others
climate disasters. "29
The Chinese are predicting return motion
not only is it based mostly on precedence as a result of others
the claimants have also made a previous restoration. Yet the restoration
features, even if they are insignificant, are alarming
combination. For instance, from 2013 to 2015, China recovered 17 occasions
more than 20 months more than some other claimant
during the last 40 years30 This consists of about 95% of all Spratly's regenerated nations
Although regional mechanisms exist, China has tried to bypass
its underlying spirit and undermines its effectiveness with ambiguity and
elsewhere. One example is the Southeast Asian Affiliation of 2002
Declaration by the Nations (ASEAN) on the conduct of the parties in southern China
Seas. The notice requires that the events "chorus from settling
these days uninhabited island, reefs, footwear, cays and different features. "32
Nevertheless, China's recovery and militarization actions have
continued to realize momentum on priority criteria similar to' what motion must be taken
"Frozen" is just not listed and outlined undoubtedly [declaration]. "33
The state of affairs is aggravated by ASEAN's incapability to realize
settlement and consolidate their response, the state of affairs is usually organized
China itself, making Chinese methods unchanged

Though the state can make a robust protest
China is usually opposed to those considerations by the Chinese strategy,
offered that there isn’t any sufficient international veto
shouldn’t be robust enough. An example can be the 2015 landmark
Everlasting Courtroom of Arbitration involving the Philippines and
In China on the rights and obligations of SCS. Though
the choice was a official international instrument unambiguously
In the Philippines, Chinese individuals merely rejected the decision. Rationalization
China's place is worldwide in scope and consistency
the reply to such a outcome. After the judgment
international strain on the Chinese to confess that the decision is muted
didn’t register a big think about Chinese points.
With a world response, enthusiasm – not
with ultimatum – that China found "response [its] "did not cause" extreme prices ".
Thus, the gradual grey hue strategy was retained. this is
notably necessary given the restricted capacity of the Philippines
value to Chinese

Alternatively, evaluation exhibits that every time a
concrete and robust regional / international response,
China's strategy is properly reviewed and
calibrate. For instance, in 2004, when the Chinese submarine did it
virgin embedded passage via the Ishigaki Strait, sharp Japanese
the response pressured China to withdraw from its position and expressed its remorse
publicly.34 China isn’t
The Senkaku Islands had the identical strategy to island development, t
because the unambiguous US articulation Senkaku is part of
US security umbrella for Japan.35 A
An analogous strategy may be seen in Taiwan, with a quiet US
participation restricts Chinese gradual grey zones actions.36
Whereas smaller gamers are involved, decisive motion is usually
pressured China to recalibrate its strategy. One instance might be in 2014
Hai Yang Shi You 981 Removing the Oil Tray
China-Vietnam, the place China used state-owned national
Offshore Oil Company near the controversial Paracel
The islands
Vietnam's aggressive response to techniques in Chinese gray zones. Vietnamese
fishing boats and coastguards collided and used water
guns towards Chinese fishing / anti-naval vessels, t
based mostly on Chinese practices. In front
Vietnam, China's last and decisive motion
canceled and famous that the preparatory work had been completed (even
though most analysts disagree with this) .38

Separating chinese language operations and inactivity from the general strategy of SCS could be because of the sufficiency and consistency of regional / international actions. such incidents. In addition, the unambiguous intention of the nations concerned and the power to impose costs on Chinese actions is a vital factor. As is obvious from the PCA choice, Chinese acceptance of such results is dependent upon the power of the primary actors to exert strain and stay productive. On the similar time, Hai Yang Shi You 981 duplicate reflects the power of a regional state (Vietnam) to stay agency by setting the corresponding prices within the grey zone. This creates a paradigm by which regional candidates' international participation and fastened capability play a key position in integrating Chinese gradual gray zones approaches into the SCS.

US Stand

A longtime response to China's actions in SCS, a
The US response to gradual graying in SCS is
principally free to maneuver to China. But before being absent
The US response to SCS issues is unlucky
essential to critically assess the causes and results
such actions

Wider US Resistance to Participation
The SCS issues come from a principled place with a purpose to avoid a share of regional
regional disputes by which the USA urged the events
solves issues "in accordance with international law"
In addition, america finds this, aside from freedom
navigation beneath worldwide regulation, SCS issues usually are not affected
its principal national interests. Thus, the US technique for SCS is a
an informed selection that’s exercised inside a political and strategic context
participation in regional issues. Minister Hillary Clinton
had introduced in 2012 that the US has been clear and consistent
. . . we do not take half of the competing sovereignty of the country
South China Sea. "40
In 2016, Defense Minister Ashton Carter reiterated that
“America just isn’t a candidate for present delivery disputes
Within the Asia-Pacific region, and does not take a position on which aspect
sovereignty to demand controversial land options. "41 At the same time, the United States has repeated its right to" fly, sail and act in any worldwide regulation. "42 Nevertheless, such a US strategy is

Initially, while america repeats
that its advantages are only in international maritime issues
jurisdiction and freedom of movement (and not regional
disputes), it must be remembered that the Chinese interpretation
maritime competence is linked to its necessities for maritime areas.
Mainly China is slowly expanding its sea areas, each of which is
Inside the SCS, there’s extended maritime competence.
As well as, Chinese interpretation of international delivery
which the USA clearly has shares
between the two sides. For instance, China interprets
beneath international regulation to exclude innocent passage in a regional space
and monitoring and intelligence gathering
unique financial zones
Principally China makes use of coercive measures within the grey zone techniques to broaden it
Surveillance of the marine areas of SCS, which in flip claims
expanded oversight of maritime competence in wider international areas
In SCS. So in the USA it’s unintentional
China's enlargement of international
In SCS, which finally impacts its core
interests. The effectiveness of US 'navigation freedom' patrolling is pointless
with this in mind, as China is at present consolidating
before its sea areas
jurisdiction beneath international regulation might name it full
under consideration. When the disputed sea areas are underneath control
good, China can begin to categorical more restrictive powers
the suitable to international connections in these areas.
It’s clear that China is enjoying an extended recreation and isn’t going to challenge
US peacekeeping system, however nonetheless
prepare for the time it has to. Brief-time period myopia in America

The associated drawback is that when
an efficient response to gradual grey zone methods requires deeper motion
international commitments and invitations
The problems are usually not convincing allies, and many are on the lookout for options. Even
Although america has expressed its reorganization to Asia
strategy, allies see a battle between will and action.44
Regional states are of the opinion that america doesn’t need to act alone
and the chief architect of SCS's unified worldwide consensus
points. This is not a small thing in East Asia, where there’s confidence and consensus
are key features, particularly with america
“External Power.” Statement by the Philippine Department
In 2015, the Ministry for Overseas Affairs read: “America has failed.” 45
Common Benjamin Defensor, former head of the Philippines, was found
an interview that the USA won’t assist. . .
The Philippines [is] work better in curbing and interesting to the world
46 South Korean and
Monitor 1.5 Channel Japanese officials present that it’s rising
The challenges of the grey zone might undermine the credibility of the US commitments. "47
It isn’t shocking that states contemplate the relocation in China to be engaging
the proposal. As Robert Kaplan stated within the brief time period, it’s weaker
America's dedication to the region might lead states to China
Peripheral transit with China. "48
In this mild, the "turning to China" of the Philippines is quick
sense. “America has lost it. . . . I [have] allotted by myself
[Chinese] ideological circulate, proclaimed President Rodrigo Duterte throughout
President of the Beijing-China Commerce Organization in 2009. t
October 2016.49

The related problem is that even the USA
has replied, there are considerable inconsistencies in the answer,
who don’t lose allies. For instance, one can mention
East China Sea ADIZ in November 2013. US Military expressed
"Deep concern" in unilateral action and B-52 long range bombers
showed willpower by way of ADIZ. At the similar time,
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a notice to air carriers
calls on US civil aircraft to adjust to China's ADIZ.50 commonplace
While such inconsistencies may be troublesome to reconcile, it have to be
the US technique shouldn’t be wider
in the gray zone. In his context, army
was rightly making an attempt to revive the status quo ante (statements and
B-52 sorties), whereas the FAA targeted on flight safety. Strategic
Thus, the reorganization and recalibration of the US strategy may be in order. Analysts see the US's lowered dedication to SCS as one of many potential signs and a deeper judgment about slicing power. Two US scientists declare that every time “the power of the existing order, authority and legitimacy is questioned, cutting the leading power means a bending point in the fall of the leading power and in the final drop.” North Korean aspirations – as a method to challenge the US-led international order. Gray Zones Opponents constitute a "globalized rebellion that challenges the fundamental system of an international system and order based on the current advanced industrial nation (and largely western)." 52 The SCS evolving security matrix subsequently requires a deeper reassessment. US Strategies and Priorities in the Space

Strategic Need

The harder question is
options. It may be argued that the USA
there are restricted choices for solving such issues. To deal with this facet
The next discussions present some choices / recommendations

To start with, the US strategy to SCS needs
exceed mere tactical advantages from the broader and extra
comprehensive technique. Primarily, you need a broader one
Recalibration of the US strategy to combat the gradual gray zone
techniques brought on by totally different powers. These are three features
recalibration: acceptance, articulation and use

Acceptance is
recognition of the necessity for the US to strategy the Chinese gray zones
response, but present responses aren’t sufficiently targeted
menace. The US Military continues to be targeted on the duality of conflict and peace,
when the gray zones work between the 2 Absolutes. Truly
Black and White Western Strategy to Battle "creates gaps and seam in the gray zone of opponents."
There’s also asymmetry in danger detection when determination-makers are
“Hypersensitive to dangers related to potential escalation
within the grey zone and [thus] more conservatively within the gray zone
competitive. “54 Authoritarian
techniques are additionally higher outfitted to implement grey zone methods
a comparison of the techniques of democratic checks and balances the place energy is
decentralized and determination-making is scattered.55 Grey zone issues also create a way of constant conflict, which is demanded by democratic methods anchored in traditional ideas of warfare and peace.56 America, which is undoubtedly probably the most capable soldier on the earth, will not be nicely outfitted, however poorly oriented to deal with such challenges.57 This confirms the need to undertake gray zone conflicts as a separate state act.
For example, Japan has outlined a grey zone for the 2014 annual
White Paper on Protection "in conditions the place there isn’t a peace and no peace
59. Likewise,
Australia has marked gray zones resembling capture and
a selective interpretation of the regulation of the ocean as considerations,

The subsequent step in making a comprehensive technique requires an unambiguous effort to question such approaches. This consists of setting a clear purple line in grey zone situations if this is mandatory for national interests. Pink line violations have to be answered by expanding, multi-dimensional, value-control measures. It must be remembered that the gradual grey zone approaches the pink strains with out. The construction of the island, the ADIZ discover and the exclusion of the PCA rule are all examples the place the pink line or counter-motion was not formulated. A transparent purple line, as achieved through the Cuban missile disaster or Russian intervention in Ukraine, claims that "significant penalties are imposed on an aggressor who violates international norms with their revolutionaryism in their gray zone." 61 There are apparent penalties for many who are notably effective if the protagonist doesn’t intend to have irreversible consequences, China is an instance.

The last facet is the appliance.
The actions of the grey zones are sometimes coated with ambiguity and credibility
questioning, which makes it troublesome for them to battle. Confusion and
demanding readability from potential operators helps to slender the problem and
attraction to purple strains to punish such actions. One example can be
presenting company proof to the international group
The separatists supported by Russia undercut MH-17 over Ukraine, which resulted in stricter sanctions towards Moscow.62
This was in the mild of the direct detachment in Russia.
The appliance requires opposing initiators to help a
dedication to implement pink strains. Such a transfer requires a wider scope
with worldwide consensus effective, gray zone techniques

In addition to conceptual restructuring, it’s apparent
who present the answers to the challenges of gray zones are all the time linked to pure
army tools. Nevertheless, such an strategy is flawed because of the gray space
The measures are aimed toward using a. Army and army elements
state of affairs. Subsequently, each army response will endure
unintentional enlargement and response mismatch. Is
common have to integrate options outdoors the US Department
Defense alone. A coordinated holistic strategy will come
it is essential to progressively cope with grey zones in an applicable method

Diplomatic Measures On the diplomatic degree, more worldwide help is required for professional regional considerations and the irresponsible gradual gray areas of the parties concerned are highlighted. Declarations, akin to "our commitment to the Philippines, may be inadequate, lacking international support for the key interests of the partner concerned, such as the results of the Partnership and Cooperation Arbitration Arbitration for the Philippines." “The diplomatic strategy that required the expulsion, development and militarization of controversial options within the SCS might have to be reformed.64 It might even be mandatory to offer for a coordinated US response within the gray zone techniques area. . This will embrace continuing with the 2016 Asia-Pacific Maritime Safety Initiative Regulation, which renews the US dedication to an SCS operator. America's Proper to Freedom of Motion on the Asia-Pacific Waterways and Wider Help to the States of Southeast Asia. The velocity of the measures could also be necessary in view of the fact that the time taken to approve the bill in the US Congress has been more than the time that China has taken again over three,000 hectares of land in SCS. The $ 425 million Marine Safety Initiative underneath the 2016 Nationwide Defense Authorization Act will create a standard maritime info community in Southeast Asia. Completion of the initiative led to the elimination of data gaps confronted by companion nations.67 The USA can also be dedicated to supporting nations within the SCS extra extensively, "publicly disseminating information about China's activities at sea", which aims to coordinate monitoring. Operation.68

Army Commitment . Numerous measures could possibly be thought-about in the army sector. Initially, conventional US forces ought to be constructed, educated and outfitted to cope with the grey zone. Yhdysvaltojen joukot joutuisivat toimimaan harmaalla vyöhykkeellä nopeudella, tarkoituksella, tarkoituksella ja ratkaisulla.69 Kokonaisponnistuksen synkronointia olisi jatkuvasti ohjattava taistelevat komentajat, jotka tarvitsevat valtuudet toimia aktiivista harmaata vyöhykekilpailua vastaan uudet valmiudet ja ketterät mallit kampanjoinnille. 70 Samalla Yhdysvallat voisi harkita "harmaasävyisten vyöhykkeiden valmiuksien" rakentamista kumppanimaiden keskuudessa tällaisten haasteiden ratkaisemiseksi. Tavoitteena olisi asteittain vahvistaa väkivallan tekijöiden harmaiden vyöhykkeiden toimimattomuutta rakentamalla kumppanikapasiteettia. Näihin voisi kuulua sellaisten tietotoimintojen kehittäminen, kuten kyberominaisuudet, joiden avulla voidaan kuvitella käsityksiä ja korostaa kysymyksiä, sekä harmaasävyalueiden voimavarat varojen avulla (nopeat partioalukset, rannikkotutka ketjut, valvontavalmiudet, pienet miehittämättömät ilma-alukset), vastaharjoitukset valmiudet ja valmiuksien rakentaminen, esimerkiksi.71

Sotilaallisten kumppaneiden monipuolistaminen alueellisten
valtiot, mukaan lukien Australia, Intia ja Japani, vahvistuisivat
alueellinen integraatio sekä minimoida Yhdysvaltojen osallistuminen
Indonesia, Malesia ja Filippiinit ovat äskettäin allekirjoittaneet
sopimus merirajojen yhteisestä partioinnista piratismin ja
militancy alueella. Tällaisen yhteistyön laajentaminen alueellisten toimien torjumiseksi
harmaiden vyöhykkeiden asennot voitaisiin katsoa.73
Rannikkovartiosto ja rannikkovartiosuhteet saattaisivat edistää hienovaraisuutta
to gray zone threats in lieu of more kinetic and conspicuous navy-to-navy ties.

Another line of effort might embrace better entry to island territories. A number of sea areas in the SCS remain uncharted, with hazards to navigation and restricted communication amenities.74 Higher access to such areas, dredging operations, and charting of these areas might overcome a number of the Chinese benefits within the gray zone. Moreover, there is a need to assist regional navies in building capability for increased maritime area awareness, along with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations.75 U.S. Special Operations help remains targeted on overseas inner protection, aside from safety cooperation and train-and-equip missions. Such cooperation might be diversified to counter grey zone actions, reminiscent of combat search and rescue, night time capability, maritime interdiction functionality, go to-board-search-seizure capabilities, and so forth.76

Financial Measures. Economic penalties for these actors pursuing graduated grey zone techniques constitute a visual and efficient deterrent. Russian hybrid warfare actions in Crimea, for example, have been countered by means of financial sanctions.77 In addition, funding help might be thought-about for states looking for to shore up their defensive capabilities towards gray zone challenges.

The evolving security state of affairs in the South China Sea is difficult by graduated strategies adopted by China that utilize coercive instruments of national energy. These instruments operate in the gray zone, making certain incremental good points with out invoking an escalatory response or worldwide intervention. The time-area synchronization of these approaches is such that they appear as incidents, as an alternative of a collection of interconnected and cohesive parts. Furthermore, restricted U.S. intervention has enabled China to successfully impose measures on smaller regional gamers. Restricted response functionality among smaller nations has considerably altered regional dynamics, to the detriment of regional players, and also broader worldwide norms. Because of the detrimental impression of such methods on sovereignty, maritime jurisdictional frameworks, and international commerce, there is a need for wider recalibration of the U.S. strategy to gray zone techniques. America needs to play a extra proactive position in aiding regional gamers in countering China’s broader technique of coercive gradualism and gray zone techniques. Towards this, aside from broader conceptual recalibration, america must implement institutional modifications to answer grey zone activities, along with entire-of-government engagement on specific diplomatic, informational, army, and economic parts.

*Concerning the writer: Captain Kapil Bhatia, Indian Navy, wrote this essay whereas a scholar at the U.S. Naval Conflict School. It gained the 2018 Secretary of Protection National Security Essay Competitors.

Source: This text was revealed in the Joint Drive Quarterly 91, which is revealed by the Nationwide Protection University.


1 William G. Pierce, Douglas G. Douds, and Michael A. Marra, “Countering Gray Zone Wars—Understanding Coercive Gradualism,” Parameters 45, no. 3 (September 22, 2015), 51.

2 Hal
Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone,” Overseas Policy Analysis Institute
(E-Notes), February 5, 2016, out there at

three Pierce, Douds, and Marra, “Countering Gray Zone Wars,” 51.

4 Ibid., 52.

5 “The Death of Gradualism,” The Economist, March 6, 1997, obtainable at .

6 Analysis of incidents within the current previous reveals a graduated technique of coercive instruments being employed:

  • Firing
    Incidents. January 8, 2005: Chinese ships fired on two Vietnamese
    fishing boats from Thanh Hoa Province, killing 9 individuals. See Cao Ngo
    and Ngoc Minh, “Chinese Ships ‘Shot to Kill’ Vietnamese Fishermen;
    Survivor,” Vietnam Seaports Association, January 17, 2005; February 25,
    2011: Chinese frigate Dongguan fired three photographs at Philippine fishing boats in the vicinity of Jackson Atoll. See Tessa Jamandre, “China Fired at Filipino Fishermen in Jackson Atoll,” ABS-CBN Information, June three, 2011, out there at .
  • Harassment Actions. March 2009: Five Chinese ships harassed U.S. surveillance ship USNS Impeccable.
    See Yuli Yang, “Pentagon Says Chinese Vessels Harassed U.S. Ship,” CNN,
    March 9, 2009, obtainable at
  • Clashes. Might 26, 2011: Chinese maritime patrol vessels conflict with Vietnamese Binh Minh 02
    oil and fuel survey ship. See “Vietnam Accuses China in Seas Dispute,”
    BBC News, Might 30, 2011, obtainable at
    ; March 19, 2016:
    Chinese coast guard boat and Indonesian vessel conflict off the Natuna
    Islands. See Tri Listiyarini, “Indonesia to Summon Chinese Ambassador over Natuna Islands Standoff,” The Jakarta Globe, March 21, 2016, out there at .
  • Standoffs. April 2012: Standoff between Philippine warship Gregorio del Pilar and two Chinese surveillance vessels in the Scarborough Shoal. See “China, Philippines Locked in Naval Standoff,” CNN, April 11, 2012, obtainable at .

7 On
Might 2, 2014, Vietnamese naval ships and Chinese vessels collided in the
South China Sea. See “Vietnam and China Ships ‘Collide in South China
Sea,’” BBC News, Might 7, 2014, out there at

8 Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones, “Rising Powers and State Transformation: The Case of China,” European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 1 (2016), 72–98.

9 “South
China Sea: China ‘Has Right to Set Up Air Defence Zone,’” BBC News,
July 13, 2016, obtainable at

10 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Energy Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 114. Additionally cited in Robert D. Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the Finish of Secure Pacific (New York: Random House, 2015), 7.

11 Quoted in Pierce, Douds, and Marra, “Countering Gray Zone Wars,” 55.

12 Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone.”

13 The Grey Zone (Tampa, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, September 9, 2015), 2.

14 Pierce, Douds, and Marra, “Countering Gray Zone Wars,” 52.

15 Nathan P. Freier et al., Outplayed:
Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Grey Zone: A Report Sponsored by
the Military Capabilities Integration Middle in Coordination with Joint
Employees J-39/Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Branch (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Military Warfare School Press, 2016), 33.

16 See also Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Third Sea Drive, The Individuals’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA, China Maritime Report No. 1 (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval Warfare School, March 2017), 8.

17 Quoted in Andrew Erickson, The South China Sea’s Third Pressure: Understanding and Countering China’s Maritime Militia,
Testimony Earlier than the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, Home
Armed Providers Committee, September 21, 2016; Andrew Erickson, “The
South China Sea’s Third Drive: Understanding and Countering China’s
Maritime Militia,” Harvard Fairbank Middle weblog, September 8, 2017,
obtainable at

18 Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 127.

19 Wu Ningbo, “China’s Rights and Interests in the South China Sea: Challenges and Policy Responses,” Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs 8, no. 4 (2016), 286–297. Emphasis added.

20 Erickson, The South China Sea’s Third Drive.

21 Also cited in Isaiah Wilson III and Scott Smitson, “Are Our Strategic Models Flawed? Solving America’s Gray-Zone Puzzle,” Parameters 46, no. four (2016–2017), 57.

22 Michael J. Mazarr, Mastering the Grey Zone: Understanding a Changing Period of Conflict
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Military Conflict School Press, 2015), 1. Additionally
cited in Wilson and Smitson, “Are Our Strategic Models Flawed?”

23 Walter R. Mead, “The End of History Ends,” The American Interest,
December 2, 2013, out there at
Additionally cited in Wilson and Smitson, “Are Our Strategic Models Flawed?”

24 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Curiosity of America in Sea Energy, Present and Future (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1897), 283.

25 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy, Compared and Contrasted with the Rules and Follow of Army Operations on Land
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Firm, 1911), 306. Additionally quoted in James
R. Holmes, “Strategic Options of the South China Sea: A Robust
Neighborhood for Hegemons,” Naval Struggle School Review 67, no. 2 (2014), 34.

26 Ibid.

27 Major Common Peng Guangqian, Individuals’s Liberation Army (Ret.), “China’s Maritime Rights and Interests,” in Army Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and Worldwide Regulation in the Maritime Commons, ed. Peter Dutton (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval Warfare School, December 2010).

28 Mazarr, Mastering the Grey Zone, 1. Additionally cited in Wilson and Smitson, “Are Our Strategic Models Flawed?” 57.

29 Keith Johnson, “The Meltdown of the Global Order,” Overseas Coverage,
July 23, 2015, obtainable at

30 The Asia Pacific Maritime Safety Strategy: Attaining U.S. National Security Aims in a Changing Surroundings (Washington, DC: Division of Protection, 2015), 16.

31 Ibid.

32 2002 ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties within the South China Seas,
October 17, 2012, out there at

33 Ningbo, “China’s Rights and Interests in the South China Sea,” 289.

34 See Peter Dutton, Scouting, Signaling and Gatekeeping: Chinese Naval Operations in Japanese Waters and the International Regulation Implications, China Maritime Research No. 2 (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval Struggle School, 2009), 26.

35 Freier et al., Outplayed, 39. Also see Ankit Panda, “Mattis: Senkakus Covered under U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,” The Diplomat,
February 6, 2017, out there at

36 Taiwan Relations Act, Pub L. 96-Eight, 96th Cong., out there at .

37 Michael Green et al., Countering Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Concept and Apply of Grey Zone Deterrence
(Washington, DC: Middle for Strategic and International Research, 2017),
obtainable at

38 Ibid.

39 Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China: Points for Congress, R42784 (Washington,
DC: Congressional Analysis Service, October 22, 2012), out there at

40 “Remarks
with Secretary of Protection Leon Panetta, Philippines Overseas Secretary
Albert del Rosario, and Philippines Protection Secretary Voltaire Gazmin
after Their Meeting,” Washington, DC, April 30, 2012, out there at

41 Ash Carter, “The Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Security,” Overseas Affairs 95, no. 6 (November/December 2016), 65–75.

42 “U.S.
Pacific Command Change of Command Handle: As Delivered by Secretary of
Protection Ash Carter,” Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam, Hawaii, Might 27,
2015, out there at
Also cited by Phuong Nguyen, “Deciphering the Shift in America’s South
China Sea Coverage,” Modern Southeast Asia 38, no. three (December 2016), 407–408.

43 Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Financial Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China.

44 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Overseas Coverage, October 11, 2011, out there at .

45 Xuan Loc Doan, “Why the Philippines’ Pivot from the U.S. to China Is Unusual,” Asia Occasions (Hong Kong), October 19, 2016, out there at . Additionally see Yuji Vincent Gonzales, “‘America Has Failed Us’—Yasay,” Inquirer.internet, October 6, 2016, obtainable at .

46 Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 134.

47 Van Jackson, “Tactics of Strategic Competition: Gray Zones, Redlines, and Conflicts before War,” Naval Conflict School Review 70, no. 3 (Summer time 2017), 41. Also see Brad Glosserman, “Struggling with the Gray Zone: Trilateral Cooperation to Strengthen Deterrence in Northeast Asia,” Points & Insights 15, no. 13 (November 10, 2015).

48 Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 176.

49 Full
textual content of Rodrigo Duterte’s keynote tackle at the Philippines-China
Commerce and Funding Discussion board, Beijing, October 20, 2016, out there at

50 See Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 43 (2014), obtainable at .

51 Wilson and Smitson, “Are Our Strategic Models Flawed?” 60.

52 Ibid., 59.

53 Ibid., 60.

54 Freier et al., Outplayed, 75.

55 Additionally
see John Chambers, “Countering Grey-Zone Hybrid Threats: An Analysis of
Russia’s ‘New Generation Warfare’ and Implications for the U.S. Military,”
Trendy Conflict Institute weblog, October 18, 2016, 18.

56 See Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone, 107.

57 Brands, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone.”

58 Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone, 137.

59 Defence of Japan Annual White Paper 2014
(Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defence, 2014), obtainable at

60 Australian Defense White Paper 2016 (Sydney: Department of Defence, 2016), obtainable at .

61 Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone, 136.

62 Manufacturers, “Paradoxes of the Gray Zone.”

63 Carter, “The Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Security.”

64 See
Amy Sawitta Lefevre and Trinna Leong, “Southeast Asian Nations Again
Halt to Land Reclamation in South China Sea,” Reuters, August 4, 2015,
out there at

65 See Asia-Pacific Maritime Safety Initiative Act of 2016, S.2865, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., April 27, 2016.

66 As on March 23, 2018, the standing of the Asia-Pacific Maritime Safety Initiative Act of 2016, which was launched on April
27, 2016, was “Read twice and referred to the Committee on Overseas
Relations.” Out there at

67 “Reality
Sheet: U.S. Constructing Maritime Capability in Southeast Asia,” The White
House, Washington, DC, November 17, 2015, obtainable at

68 Carter, “The Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Security.”

69 Ibid., 83.

70 Ibid., 80.

71 Additionally see Mazarr, Mastering the Grey Zone, 68, on info operations; Ely Ratner, “Course Correction: How to Stop China’s Maritime Advance,” Overseas Affairs, June/July 2017, out there at ; and Nguyen, “Deciphering the Shift in America’s South China Sea Policy,” 405.

72 See additionally Murray Hiebert, Phuong Nguyen, and Gregory B. Poling, Building a Extra Strong U.S.-Philippines Alliance: A Report of the CSIS Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Research (Washington, DC: Middle for Strategic and Worldwide Studies, 2015), x. See additionally Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 130.

73 Indonesia/Philippines/Malaysia: Agreement on Patrolling Shared Maritime Border
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress International Authorized Monitor, 2017),
out there at

74 “China
Warship Stranded on Philippines’ Hasahasa Shoal,” GMA News, July 13,
2012, obtainable at

75 Kaplan, Asia’s Cauldron, 129.

76 Additionally see Linda Robinson, Patrick B. Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016).

77 Pierce, Douds, and Marra, “Countering Gray Zone Wars,” 55.